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I. Introduction
Scholars who compare common law and civil law countries have long argued that civil law legal systems like Germany do not employ formal rules of evidence comparable to those which govern American courtrooms. 2 John Langbein describes the French and German legal systems as unencumbered by "a body of rules designed to exclude probative information for fear of the trier's inability to evaluate it." 3 While Mirjan Damaska notes that continental systems employ a few exclusionary principles to limit the fact-finder's reliance on certain types of evidence, such as hearsay or uncharged criminal conduct, he, too, concludes that "there is no gainsaying that a great deal of information, inadmissible under common law evidentiary rules, reaches the continental adjudicators." 4 Continental prosecutors do not confront the difficult task of determining, as common law prosecutors must, "whether the logically relevant information he has gathered will successfully undergo the legal metamorphosis into technically competent evidence." 5 The complex and restrictive nature of American evidentiary rules is said to be an artifact of the adversarial process and its reliance on lay juries, whom the rules of evidence shield from information that the legal system does not trust them to evaluate accurately or dispassionately. 6 Civil law systems that commit fact-finding to mixed panels of lay and professional judges trust them to make proper allowances for the infirmity of certain types of 2 Mirjan Damaska, "Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study," 121 Pa. L. Rev. 506, 513 (1973) ( "It is said that while common law systems are mainly concerned with the issue of admissibility, civil law systems admit all evidence that is logically relevant"); John H. Langbein, "The German Advantage in Civil Procedure," 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823, 829 (1985) (praising "the virtual absence of [German] counterpart to the Anglo-American law of evidence."); Kenneth Williams, "Do We Really Need the Fedral Rules of Evidence?" 74 N. Dakota L. Rev. 1 (1998) . 3 John H. Langbein, "The Criminal Trial Before Lawyers," 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 315-316 (1978) . 4 Damaska, "Evidentiary Barriers," Note 2 supra at 519. 5 Id at 521. 6 According to McCormack, "It is safe to say that without the jury there would be no law of evidence remotely resembling the rules of admissibility which make up its contents in English-speaking countries today," ("Evidence," in 5 Encyclopedia of Social Science 639 (1931) .
are not designed to forestall improper influences on the jury, but to safeguard the rights of criminal suspects. But many other systemic differences flow from the disparate timing of evidentiary constraint. Because German evidentiary rules intervene at the point at which the evidence is gathered and shaped, rather than at the later stage when it elicited as testimony in court, these rules benefit the full range of criminal suspects, including those who plead guilty. In this they differ from American courtroom rules, which benefit only the small number of criminal defendants who go to trial. To obtain the benefit of evidentiary rules, American defendants must elect to go to trial and forego the option of pleading guilty and receiving a lower sentence. And because German evidentiary rules affect the conduct of the investigation rather than the trial, such norms constrain investigators rather than litigators. Accordingly, their application lacks the public, performative character of courtroom rules-while presupposing a significant degree of training and professionalism among the police, as well as a greater degree of uniformity and transparency in the investigative process.
There are a variety of ways in which German evidentiary norms influence the flow of information to the fact-finder. Investigative rules such as warrant requirements may restrict the availability of certain investigative tactics, increasing police reliance on alternatives. Instead of regulating when the police may use certain investigative techniques, investigative norms may also regulate how the police may use them, for example by regulating how the police may question criminal suspects, or, whom, indeed, they may question. By comparison to its American counterpart, German criminal procedure imposes more constraints both on the choice of investigative techniques and the manner of their application. To be sure, both the United
States and Germany require warrants for electronic surveillance; and compliance with the warrant procedure virtually ensures that the resulting interceptions will be usable as evidence at trial. 8 But in Germany, warrant requirements play a much more important role in securing the usability (or admissibility) of evidence for the simple reason that many more investigative acts, including long-term visual surveillance and undercover operations, are subject to warrant requirements. 9 Likewise, Germany imposes more significant constraints on the questioning of witnesses. 10 Though the United States recognizes testimonial privileges for psychiatrists, lawyers, and spouses, these protections only apply to live testimony; thus they come into play fairly late in the criminal process. In Germany, by contrast, privileges not only cover many more familial relationships; they also apply outside the courtroom, to the initial criminal inquiry.
The significance of these investigative rules is invisible to those who focus primarily on courtroom procedure in contrasting American and German evidentiary systems. Thus it is no doubt true that German courtrooms lack the complex and technical rules of evidence that shape American trials; but the greater informality of fact-finding in the German criminal process is made possible by and takes place in the shadow of significant constraints on the acquisition of evidence. These constraints have no counterpart in American regulation of investigative procedure; their true counterpart, in the U.S. legal system, is the complex system of courtroom rules that govern the presentation of evidence at trial (and the uses which jurors may make of the evidence.)
German regulation of police interrogation-particularly its treatment of deceptive stratagems-provides perhaps the clearest and most striking example of the vitally important role 8 St PO 100a, 100c. 9 See Jacqueline E. Ross "Germany's Federal Constitutional Court and the Regulation of GPS Surveillance," 6
German Law Journal No. 12 (online, 2005) 10 Section 52 St PO (Criminal Procedure Code of the Federal Republic of Germany.) "[I[n addition to refusing to answer self-incriminating questions, in many European jurisdictions witnesses can refuse to answer questions potentially capable of incriminating members of their family. Some countries go even further and dispense witnesses from the duty to answer any question likely to dishonor them or expose them to direct financial loss." Damaska, Evidence Law Adrift , supra, at 13. See also Ronale Allen et al., The Gemran Advantage in civil Procedure: A Plea for More Details ´92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 705, 731-33 (1988) . that constraints on the acquisition of evidence play in shaping what comes before the trier of fact.
Rules that govern the types of questions a police officer may ask, and how he may phrase them, greatly resemble the formal limits that American rules of evidence place on the questioning of witnesses. But German constraints are not rules of courtroom procedure; they apply to investigative conduct and to the manner by which evidence first makes its way into the case file.
If American evidentiary rules seek to cabin and channel the deliberations of a potentially aberrant fact-finder, German constraints on the acquisition of evidence are designed to control the police. German interrogation norms promote accuracy by inhibiting practices that can provoke false confessions or distort memories of past events. But German interrogation norms also protect suspects from the police. In reaction to the Nazi regime, Germany regulated interrogations through rules designed to protect suspects' right to counsel and right to silence, and, more generally, their autonomy in deciding whether to cooperate with the police.
11 The complex rules governing the acquisition of evidence from the accused are designed to safeguard these rights. A number of features of the German legal system turn these rules into powerful constraints on investigations. Germany has a more robust conception of voluntariness than the United States. It derives from this a number of interrogation rules designed to protect the autonomy of suspects in their interactions with the police. German criminal procedure enforces these norms through exclusionary rules. 12 And some courts and commentators have extended 11 St PO 136, 136a The historical origins of these protections are discussed in BGHSt 1,, 387; Degener GA 1992, 443 (463) ; LR-Hanack, 136a Rn 2. The rule is said to serve the aims of protecting autonomy and preserving the suspect's right to remain silent and passive in the face of accusation. BGHSt17, 364 (367); KK-Boujong 136a Rn 1; Lindner, "Taeuschungen in der Vernehmung des Beschuldigten," Diss. In contrasting American and German approaches to deceptive interrogation, I will argue that German regulation of investigations displays a much greater degree of ambivalence about using the suspect as a source of evidence against himself outside the protected setting of the court. But I will also argue that Germany's aggressive regulation of interrogation tactics also grows out of a commitment to conducting quality control of the evidence at the point of intake.
Germany's exclusion of defendants' statement at trial serves not to shield fact-finders from information they are ill-equipped to evaluate properly but to enforce rules about the means by which evidence is acquired. I will also suggest that the intensive regulation of investigations has prompted the police to develop a variety of techniques to evade these constraints. But these tactics invite scrutiny and challenge in a legal system that regulates evidence primarily in the investigative stage. America's tolerance for deceptive techniques of obtaining evidence stems first from our willingness to postpone procedural safeguards for the suspects until they are arrested or charged; and second, from our decision to sift evidence when it is presented, rather than when it is obtained.
In contending that German investigative constraints function as rules of evidence I do not want to claim that the German evidentiary norms have the same content or complexity or that they serve identical purposes. Instead, I will argue that courtroom rules are not the only procedural devices by which legal systems regulate the flow of information to the fact-finder.
Legal systems can regulate the transmission of knowledge about crime either at the stage of acquisition or at the point of formal presentation at trial. Controls at the investigative stage can substitute for controls at trial, and vice versa. Both modes of regulation attempt to filter out (some) unreliable evidence. And both modes filter out information for reasons unrelated to its reliability, e.g. by excluding evidence that witnesses and defendants are privileged to withhold.
In short, these modes of regulation are comparable in that both of them limit the flow of information to the fact finder and that both of them do so only partly from concern for the reliability of the evidence they exclude. I hope to explore the normative commitments behind these divergent approaches to evidentiary regulation along with their institutional presuppositions and their implications for other features of the criminal process, such as plea bargaining, discovery, and the respective roles of police, litigators and judges.
This study will focus on interrogation norms to show how German investigative norms limit and guide the acquisition of evidence at the source. I will argue that German interrogation norms, like American evidentiary rules, shape the factual record on which the legal system assesses guilt or innocence-though unlike American evidentiary rules, interrogation norms are motivated not by distrust of the fact-finder but by the desire to protect criminal suspects from unfair manipulation. I will also show that American interrogation rules impose no comparable limits on investigative conduct. What makes German interrogation rules so powerful is that they limit the ability of the police to substitute deceptive stratagems for the prohibited use of coercion. Because they so comprehensively circumscribe all official questioning of the accused, German interrogation norms can gradually lay claim to regulating all of the means by which the police acquire information from that source. Section IV will explore this tendency of interrogation norms to spill out the original confines of their application. In particular, this Section will examine the extent to which the ban on deceptive interrogations casts doubt on the legitimacy of other investigative interactions between police and suspects, such as undercover investigations and the use of jailhouse snitches. Each of these sections will explore the ways in which investigative practice permits the police to work around the system's constraints-while suggesting that such circumventions remain unstable and subject to challenge in a system that concentrates its regulation of evidence at the point of acquisition. To be sure, American courts do recognize some limits on the use of trickery or deceit.
The police may not question a defendant undercover (or through informants) about crimes with which the defendant has already been charged. 26 The police may not pose as priests, psychiatrists, court-appointed counsel to extract confessions. 27 And in Spano, the Supreme Court found that the police had violated the defendant's due process rights by permitting the defendant's friend on the force to pretend that his wife was pregnant and that he would be fired been charged. 30 The ban on posing as a priest is remarkable precisely because it is a rare exception to the general judicial tolerance of lies and ruses during questioning.
Like the privilege against compelled self-incrimination, the Due Process Clause protects defendants primarily from coercion, rather than deception. To be sure, one strand of Due Process analysis focuses on the reliability of police tactics as engines for the discovery of truth.
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Tactics that are likely to induce false confessions may overbear the defendant's will and violate his rights to due process. 32 But many deceptive stratagems are quite effective in producing true confessions. Moreover, the reliability of an interrogation tactic is only one factor in Due Process analysis. 33 Courts must consider the "totality of the circumstances" in determining whether a defendant confessed voluntarily. 34 Few deceptive stratagems will automatically require suppression of the evidence, since Due Process violations typically flow from a combination of different abuses; decisions finding such violations are usually highly fact-dependent, making it difficult to isolate deceptive tactics that are in and of themselves sufficiently egregious to violate the Fifth Amendment.
Germany seeks to filter the evidence against criminal defendants at the interrogation stage, as a way of bolstering defendants' rights-particularly the right of the accused to decide whether to make statements to the police that may be used as evidence against him. Germany's ban on deception has its origin in Germany's post-war reaction to the horrors of interrogation tactics during the Nazi regime. 41 The Federal Republic's rejection of this past accounts for a number of normative commitments that conflict with the use deceptive interrogation tactics. These include firm protections for a defendant's freedom to decide 36 Id.; Rogall, NJW 1978 , 2535 NStZ 1995, 465; Schmidt, Kriminalistik 1971 , 315. Erbs, NJW 1951 (BGHSt. 5, 290, 291 = NJW 1953 , 1114 , 1115 13, 60, 61 = NJW 1959 13, 60, 61 = NJW , 1142 BGHSt. 34, 365, 369 = NJW 1987 , 2524 Hanack LR RdNr. 62; Meyer-Goßner RdNr. 28; Herdegen NStZ 1990, 513, 518; aA BGHSt. 31, 395, 400 = NJW 1983 , 2205 47 Kleinknecht/Meyer-Gossner, Kommentar zum Strafprozessrecht, Section 136a. 48 Prasch, supra note __ at 63. This informational right-which is often described as a protection for privacy--is buttressed by robust privileges for family members, including aunts and cousins, who may not be compelled to submit to questioning or implicate the accused. 49 Roxin, NStZ 1997, 18 ; Prasch, supra note __ at 77.
Germany's efforts to bolster the defendant's right to silence are not the sole reason for the complexity and density of German interrogation norms. Germany's ban on leading and misleading questioning also derives from the organization of fact-finding in German criminal procedure. German fact-finding is not governed by the parties; the prosecution and the defense do not build separate, competing cases for presentation at trial. In theory, at least, the police occupy a more neutral role during the pretrial investigation, since their inquiry is meant to assist the trial judge who bears primary responsibility for examining witnesses at trial (and who has access to the case file containing transcripts of interviews with the accused and other witnesses.) 50 Deceptive stratagems conflict with the responsibility of the police for developing both exculpatory and incriminating evidence in an unbiased fashion. Misleading questioning may also interfere with the judge's ability to elicit reliable evidence. As Mirjan Damaska has noted, "interviews conducted by partisan lawyers in preparation for the adversary trial can potentially pollute informational sources in ways that cannot later be detected." 51 In particular, "queries can have serious distorting effect on memory images. Gaps in recollections can be filled by interviewees with suggested materials, and this material can then be used by them in the inferential reconstruction of events." 52 Accordingly, interrogation norms prohibit the police from "putting words" into the suspect's mouth or from suggesting a characterizations of events.
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This prohibition has roots in Roman law. 54 Since such tactics risk distorting the truth, the ban on deceptive interrogation practices along with the technical interrogation rules apply to the 50 Mirjan R. Damaska, Evidence Law Adrift 72, 115 (Yale, 1997). Though witnesses previously interviewed by the police must be re-examined at trial, "records of prior fact-finding can be used by the presiding judge to stabilize proof-taking at trial-using them as a script to guide witnesses through their testimony, for example." Id at 72. Thus, "records of prior proof-taking continueto find their way to the trier of fact. To decide a case solely on the evidence as adduced at the trial is still a rare event in Continental practice." Id at 71. 51 Id at 97. 52 Id at 96. 53 Kuehne, NStZ 1985, 252 (255) ; Eisenberg JZ 1984, 912 (915 Germany's prohibition of suggestive or misleading questioning is implemented through detailed rules that that regulate the informational interactions between suspects and police. These norms are comparable to American evidentiary rules in that they significantly limit and shape the information that reaches the trier of fact. But the German legal system places less emphasis on regulating the ways in which evidence is used or presented at trial because it scrutinizes the means by which evidence is first acquired.
B. Ambivalence about interrogation: a source of evidentiary complexity 1. Impermissible "Deception" and Permissible "Subterfuge"
American evidentiary rules are complex in part because they represent compromises between the search for truth and competing policy goals (though evidence is also excluded to shield the jury from information that it may not evaluate properly). Otherwise relevant evidence may be excluded to promote settlements or promote remedial measures. 57 German interrogation rules are complex for similar reasons. The impulse to protect the autonomy of the accused conflicts with the search for the truth and, in particular, with the impulse to seek information from its logical source. In protecting the accused, German law defines deception broadly to encompass not only outright lies but misleading non-verbal conduct. 58 If the police question a murder suspect in a case in which they never found the murder weapon, they may not produce a weapon of the same type and place it wordlessly in front of the suspect, hoping to trick him into believing that they possess the murder weapon.
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The ban on deception encompasses not only false statements but even true statements that lead to misimpressions. Thus a German appellate court found a violation of the ban when a judge induced a confession by telling the defendant (correctly) that remorse is a mitigating circumstance. After convicting the defendant, the trial judge had refused to mitigate punishment because the defendant had been motivated by the prospect of an advantage at sentencing.
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Likewise, it is may be considered deceptive to take fingerprints from a suspect and then tell him that he has the "opportunity" to confess before being told whether they match those found on the As the same time, German interrogation norms create some leeway for the police. The police are not required to reveal the evidence that incriminates the suspect. 62 Nor must they clear up any misconceptions that a defendant harbors through no fault of the police, though such confusions may affect the suspect's ability to make an intelligent choice about whether to cooperate with the authorities 63 Indeed, the police are free to exploit a defendant's confusion about the law or the facts, provided that they do not add to it or confirm his mistaken beliefs.
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What they may not do, however, is induce this confusion themselves-at least not through the use of deception.
Germany creates additional leeway for interrogation by distinguishing between the prohibited use of "deception" and permissible use of "subterfuge," 65 which is a lawful means of inducing the kind of confusion that leads a suspect to confess. The same statute that prohibits deception has been interpreted as creating a loophole permitting the questioning officer to use stratagems that fall short of outright dishonesty. 66 There is in fact a large literature seeking to clarify this elusive distinction-and an even larger literature advising the police on how to use it to their advantage. 67 It is debated, for example, whether the police may tell the accused that "a real man would admit what he did" 68 ; whether they may manipulate the suspect by feigning sympathy; 69 or whether they may play "good cop/bad cop" to coax a confessions.
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Commentators disagree about whether it is lawful, as a subterfuge, to ask "trick questions" 71 designed to elicit provable lies, or to pose ambiguous questions that may mislead, depending on how the suspect interprets them. 72 Those most skeptical of the distinction would restrict the category of permissible "subterfuge" to the exploitation of pre-existing misimpressions (not produced by the police) or, at most, to the option of posing seemingly innocuous questions that conceal the officer's purpose of eliciting incriminating admissions.
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In practice, the prosecutors and police officials use a variety of strategies to negotiate the fine line between deception and subterfuge. Some officers recalled telling suspects, "we know from other sources that it was you who committed the crime" 74 or that "sooner or later one of you guys will talk," 75 even if there was reason to believe the accomplice had already fled the country. 76 Likewise, one police official recalled telling suspects, "We already know about you.
We've already spoken with your buddy," in the belief that the statement was sufficiently ambiguous to skirt the prohibition on falsely asserting outright that the suspect's accomplice had fingered him.
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Because it is permissible to exploit existing misimpressions, police officials indicated that they would not contradict a suspect who tells an officer, "you probably know everything When all else fails, the police sometimes used their official power of questioning witnesses to trigger incriminating telephone chatter, which they could then overhear. One official remembered bringing in for questioning the girlfriend of a suspect who had invoked his right to silence. The officer knew in advance that the girlfriend would not implicate the suspect.
But before meeting with her, he obtained a wiretap order for her cellphone. As soon as the girlfriend left the police station, she called her boyfriend to tell him, "I didn't give you up."
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Thus subterfuge, combined with wiretapping, allows investigators to obtain through covert methods what the police cannot extract directly through questioning.
The Ban on Deception as a Source of Additional Interrogation Rules
The distinction between deception and subterfuge grants investigators some latitude.
However, other interrogation rules limit the ability of the police to exploit the distinction between permissible and impermissible stealth. These rules supplement the prohibition of deception with more specific constraints on interrogation. This detailed body of law promotes accuracy of fact-finding by limiting the ability of the police to shape the answers to fit the 94 One commentator argues that test questions of this sort infringe the ban on deception by producing the mistaken impression that the questioner does not already know the suspect's true whereabouts at the time of the crime (and thus the falsity of his tales.) 95 Another commentator defends such tactics as permissible stratagems, primarily on the ground that they produce alibis rather than incriminating admissions. In his view, interrogation norms apply only to those questions that prompt confessions.
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Test questions are particularly problematic, however, when the police do not already know that the exculpatory claims are false. In one such disputed scenario, a woman accused of murdering her boyfriend claims that the perpetrator was a third party assailant from whom the boyfriend had been seeking to protect her. In order to expose the falsity of this claim, the police might show the suspect a corpse of someone who, as the officer knows, could not have committed the crime. The investigator may ask the suspect if she recognizes her assailant. If the suspect claims that she does, the police will know that her story was false. These rules undoubtedly protect the autonomy of the accused in deciding whether to answer questions, going well-beyond the American privilege against compelled selfincrimination in protecting defendants from unwittingly becoming witnesses against themselves.
But many of these German interrogation norms also serve functions more closely associated with evidentiary rules, by improving the quality of the evidence ultimately presented at trial.
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Safeguards against manipulations are likely to prevent distortions of the evidence that may be difficult to uncover later through the imperfect device of cross-examination (though at the cost of forcing the prosecution to forego those truthful confessions which deceptive tactics would have produced.) Thus German interrogation rules likely produce both better and fewer confessions.
Rules that filter the way in which evidence is gathered rather than the way in which it is ultimately presented shift responsibility for applying evidentiary rules from litigators to investigators and presuppose a significant level of training and professionalism among investigators. Such rules also presuppose an investigative record that reveals the means by which evidence is obtained, and a practice of transcribing all questions asked and answers given during questioning of suspects and witnesses. Constraints on questioning only work if there is a 98 Id. 99 Id. record of the questions asked and the answers given. It remains to be seen whether those American jurisdictions that have started to videotape confessions will attract greater judicial scrutiny of interrogation tactics and spur the elaboration of new norms. At present, however, the American legal system may tacitly assume that gathering evidence -or at least the questioning of suspects --is a messy affair in which the methods employed are difficult to know about let alone to supervise, so that only the most egregious mistakes-which "shock the conscience" or overbear the will of the defendant entirely-will result in exclusion of the evidence. Certainly it is easier to enforce the requirement that the police administer warnings to the most vulnerable group of suspects, namely those in custody, than to regulate closely the dynamics of the interrogation process and the form of the questions posed. Judicial skepticism about the possibility of constraining investigative practices may be one reason why the American criminal justice system filters evidence primarily at trial, where where legal professionals pose questions publicly and under judicial supervision.
III. How the Timing of Interrogation Norms Shapes Their Evidentiary Function
German interrogation rules are able to filter the acquisition of evidence from the accused because these norms come into play from the first moment the police question the suspect.
These norms therefore govern all official interactions with the suspect. By contrast, American interrogation norms frequently apply only long after a suspect has made incriminating statements to the police, depending on the timing of arrests and indictments. As a result, American safeguards on police interrogation can serve no comparable function as evidentiary filters, since interrogation norms do not affect police interactions with suspects during the investigative phase that precedes arrest or indictment. I will argue that these differences in timing are grounded not only in constitutional doctrine but in the different management and evidentiary role of investigative case files and in the different ways in which the American and German legal systems distinguish "information" from "evidence."
Under Miranda, the police need not advise a suspect of his rights unless they have taken him into custody. 101 The Miranda court addressed itself specifically to those pressures that inhere in custodial questioning. Since the police are free to decide when they wish to place a suspect under arrest, the police may avoid their obligations under Miranda by postponing the arrest until after they have concluded their questioning. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel, too, comes into play only late in the investigative process, i.e. when the accused has been formally charged. 102 By contrast, German constraints on questioning -and the defendant's right to counsel--accrue as soon as the police question him --whether or not he is in custody, and whether or not formal charges have been brought.
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It is therefore much harder for the German police to avoid interrogation norms and the constraints they impose on the acquisition of evidence, since the Germans have less leeway than their American counterparts to manipulate the circumstances and timing of interrogations. On the surface, this may not be apparent. Constraints on questioning (and the right to counsel) accrue once the suspect becomes "the accused." But in Germany, a suspect becomes an "accused" ("der Beschuldigte") well before he is officially charged or taken into custody (at which point he becomes a criminal defendant, or "Angeklagter," enjoying additional rights.) It is the commencement of an adversarial process against him and not the deprivation of liberty that triggers procedural safeguards for the defendant's right to silence and right to counsel. In Germany, the suspect becomes a protected adversary (or target) once the investigation yields evidence that implicates the suspect in wrongdoing.
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There is, to be sure, a debate about when exactly a suspect becomes an "accused."
Some courts and commentators take the position that the status depends on the subjective attitudes of the police, that is, on the strength of their suspicions. 105 Others worry that such a test
gives the police incentives to mask their true suspicions-perhaps even from the case file and in the wording of their reports-in order to postpone as far as possible the time when they must give the suspect the status and protections of the accused. 106 These critics favor a more objective approach, which bestows or withholds the status of the "accused" once the assembled statements, reports, and forensic examinations tend to implicate the suspect in a crime. Yet other critics contend that a suspect becomes an accused as soon as the state takes any action aimed at pursuing criminal charges against him. 107 But under either of the first two approaches, the police must warn the accused and respect constraints on coercion and deception, as soon as the evidentiary record assembled in the case file makes it likely that any statements to officials will be evaluated as evidence against the speaker. 108 (Even on the subjective approach, the existence of suspicion will be gleaned in large part from the case file. 109 )
By contrast, when determining a defendant's rights and protections during questioning, the U.S. legal system focuses not on the state of the evidentiary record but on the formal stage of the proceedings against the defendant-that is, whether he has been arrested or officially 104 Id. charged. 110 Of course, the state of the evidence against a suspect is far easier to determine in a system, like Germany's, in which the case file is accessible to judge and defense counsel alike, and in which formal record-keeping requirements determine the content of the case-file. 111 In the United States, information becomes evidence through testimony or exhibits admitted into the record of courtroom or grand jury proceedings. But in Germany, information in the case file has evidentiary significance from the time it is gathered, insofar as it will determine the lawfulness of an arrest or the justification for according (or not according) a suspect the status of an accused.
The routine practice of transcribing all questions and answers during police interrogation makes it possible to determine whether the police respected interrogation norms during questioning.
The possibility of pinpointing what the government knew at any given stage of a criminal investigation -and of identifying a bounded (and complete) evidentiary record at the investigative stage--made it possible for Germany to recognize an adversarial relationship between the suspect and the state at a much earlier point in the criminal process and to enforce interrogation norms from the beginning of any investigation that focuses on the suspect.
IV. The Import of Interrogation Norms for Investigative Alternatives.
Thus the German ban on deception is a source of complex investigative constraints shaping the evidence that reaches the trier of fact at trial. Because it generates norms that serve as the preferred paradigm for obtaining evidence from the accused, the prohibition affects not 110 Of course, the United States legal system generally permits suspects to be arrested at earlier stages of the investigative process. In Germany, the requirement that people register with the authorities in their place of residence (the "Meldepflicht") makes it unnecessary to arrest them simply for the purpose of obliging them to remain reachable by the authorities. 111 In the United States, the prosecutor's and investigators' files will only come under scrutiny if there are allegations exculpatory information or other reports or statements that the prosecutor must turn over to the defense were improperly withheld. American disclosure requirements, requiring the government to turn over exculpatory evidence and prior statements of government witnesses are necessary precisely because the case file is not itself regulated (or accessible to the parties or the judge.) Yet disclosure requirements mandate the transmission of information to defense counsel, not to the fact-finder; whether such information reaches the fact-finder will depend on the parties and the rules of evidence that regulate the flow of data to the jury.
only police interrogation but other investigative techniques that are functional alternatives, out of concern that the police may circumvent constraints on one technique by substituting others that seek evidence from the same source-particularly undercover investigations and the use of jailhouse informants. Interrogation norms create threshold concerns about the legality of these investigative alternatives. And they also generate additional investigative rules that determine how evidence may be obtained undercover. Thus investigative constraints in one domain tend to propagate in another, once these investigative norms come to define the preferred method for obtaining particular types of evidence, such as incriminating statements, from a given source (like the accused.)
In the United States, the use of deception poses no special problems for undercover operations since the police are generally permitted to lie during open questioning. 112 Those limits that do apply to police interrogations do not apply to most undercover investigations.
Defendants have no Fifth or Sixth Amendment protections against undercover investigations that precede custody and indictment. Thus interrogation norms do not purport to regulate comprehensively all acquisition of evidence from the accused. Since the constraints of Miranda and the Sixth Amendment only come into play once a suspect is arrested or indicted, undercover interactions with suspects circumvent no norms that would apply to open questioning, so long as the undercover investigation is completed before charges are formally brought. While the entrapment defense protects defendants from unfair inducements to commit crimes, no analogous doctrine shields them from inducements to speak and give evidence against themselves.
By contrast, Germany's commitment to filtering evidence during acquisition rather than presentation in court has important consequences for the regulation of investigative activities other than police interrogation. Constraints on official questioning invite the police to explore 112 See note __, supra.
alternative means of acquiring evidence from the accused. The police may conduct visual or electronic surveillance or investigate suspects through undercover agents or informants. But because the German legal system regulates what comes before the fact-finder by controlling the means by which evidence is obtained, these investigative alternatives to interrogation are also highly circumscribed. The police must obtain judicial warrants covert tactics for long-term surveillance, undercover investigations, as well as electronic surveillance. 113 These investigative constraints determine what comes before the fact-finder, since compliance with the warrant procedure ensures that the results will be admissible at trial; by the same token, a failure to abide by these investigative constraints ensures exclusion of the evidence.
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Interrogation norms cast doubt on the legitimacy of covert investigations. Once the police have gathered sufficient evidence of criminal activity to obtain authorization for undercover operations against identified targets, those targets would be sufficiently implicated in wrongdoing to quality for the protected status of the accused. Because the interrogation norms protect a suspect as soon as he acquires the protected status of an accused, covert contacts with the accused invite challenge as circumventions of the interrogation norms that would govern open questioning. While the existence of legislation authorizing undercover investigations makes wholesale challenges to such tactics unlikely to succeed, critics of covert tactics question the lawfulness of some undercover operations that bear particular resemblance to interrogation.
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The analogy between undercover policing and official questioning is relatively weak when undercover agents investigate ongoing crimes or facilitate future offenses. These operations are designed to catch defendants in the act and to arrest them before they succeed in 113 St PO 100a, 100c. 114 Kleinknecht/Meyer-Gossner, Kommentar zum Strafprozessrecht, Sectin 100a, 100c; von Stetten, see note __ supra. 115 operations are designed to gather evidence of crimes that have already been completed. In unsolved murder investigations which have yielded a suspect but no evidence, the police often deploy deep cover agents to befriend the suspect and his friends, in the hope of eliciting incriminating admissions. Undercover agents make contact with suspects through shared hobbies or healthclubs and seek, over time, to become friends. 116 Working closely with psychologists, the police identify vulnerabilities that undercover agents can exploit in steering conversation and in eliciting incriminating admissions from the suspect. 117 In one elaborate operation, the police held a lottery rigged so that a murder suspect won he prize. In order to claim the prize, the suspect would have had to take a long road trip in the company of another "winner," an undercover agent.
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Undercover investigations that target past offenses are of course designed to obtain admissions by stealth that the police could not obtain through open questioning. Presumably, suspects who confide in undercover agents would not have made incriminating admissions had they known they were speaking with a police officer. Accordingly, critics of such investigations characterize them as unlawful interrogations. Haas GA 1995, 230; Fezer JZ 1987, 937. von Stetten, supra, at 116; BVerfG, StV 2000, 472. 130 BGH St 34, 362. permissible and impermissible undercover contacts. 131 Appellate courts have also s111uggested
that undercover questioning of a suspect's family violate the relatives' privilege to withhold testimony that would implicate the suspect-at least when the questioner is an informant, whose authority to participate in covert operations has not yet been regulated by statute.
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While these regulations can curtail unsavory practices, they cannot ultimately resolve the dilemma posed by manipulated admissions. Just as German law hopes for a world where agents do not commit crimes or encourage others to participate in wrongdoing, so it wants questioning of suspects conducted without coercion or trickery. Undercover policing, however, requires deception. Trickery is not an excess or abuse; it is the foundation of covert work. The very purpose of undercover policing is to obtain through stealth the intelligence and admissions that the police cannot reasonably obtain without deception. Covert operations circumvent restrictions on interrogations not because of mismanagement or overzealousness. They do so by design. To the extent that a legal system holds up an ideal of transparent questioning of suspects, where coercion and deception play little role, undercover work will continue to raise problems of legitimacy.
On the surface, German concern with manipulated admissions bears some resemblance to arguments of some American courts and commentators who object to "perjury traps" as a form Third, American unwillingness to extend interrogation norms to undercover practices may also be attributed to the circumstance that undercover practices are far more entrenched in the United States than in Germany. Deceptive interrogation tactics, particularly undercover operations, have a long history in the United States-and one that predates Miranda. 141 In postwar Germany, undercover policing is a relatively recent police practice, though it has a longer history as a tactic of domestic intelligence agencies. Undercover investigations came into use as a police tactic against domestic terrorists and later against drug dealers and organized crime in the 1970s and 1980s. 142 The constitutionality of such tactics was heavily disputed until a 1992 statute authorizing deep cover investigations was enacted to rescue such tactics from a twilight of uncertain legality. Thus, interrogation norms-and the ban on deceptive practices-were already in place when Germany first created a legal basis for the long-contested use of undercover tactics. The new statute inevitably raised questions about the compatibility of existing norms with the new investigative tactics that were specially designed to avoid them.
140 St PO 163f. There is a fourth reason why German interrogation norms, unlike their American counterparts, conflict with undercover practices. In Germany, interrogation norms and the entrapment doctrine serve as alternative means of protecting a suspect's autonomy. Just as the entrapment doctrine prohibits the police from inducing suspects to commit crimes they would not have attempted if left to their own devices, 143 the ban on deceptive questioning prohibits the police from manipulating suspects into making admissions that they would not have made if the police had not undermined their ability to choose whether to provide evidence against themselves. In the context of undercover investigations, however, the ban on entrapment provides only limited protections, because German criminal law treats entrapment as a mitigating factor at sentencing and not as a complete defense. 144 If undercover tactics could be re-characterized as a different kind of entrapment, that is, as an unfairly deceptive form of questioning, then this investigative tactic would be unlawful whenever it produces incriminating admissions-and perhaps even when it produces incriminating conduct, if crimes can be recharacterized as testimonial acts. Challenging undercover practices as unfair forms of interrogation holds particular appeal for defendants and critics of covert tactics, since the remedy for entrapped confessions, unlike the remedy for entrapped offenses, is the suppression of incriminating statements.
V. Conclusion: The Power of Evidentiary Rules as Investigative Norms
Contrary to many scholars' assumptions, detailed evidentiary rules exist in Germany as well as in the United States. Where the U.S. reserves them for the courtroom, Germany uses them as constraints on investigations. German interrogation rules, in particular, have the power to shape the evidence that reaches the fact-finder. These norms compel compliance because they exclude improperly obtained statements from being used as evidence against the accused.
Interrogation norms resemble American rules of evidence since they filter the evidence that may be used to convict.
Unlike American evidentiary constraints, however, German interrogation norms are designed to protect the accused from the police-not to keep certain facts from the fact-finder.
For that reason, Germany regulates the acquisition rather than the presentation of evidence. This makes evidentiary rules difficult to evade. If the police adapt to interrogation norms by approaching suspects through covert operatives, they may be accused of undermining the protective purposes of the rules that govern official questioning. According to German commentators who view undercover investigations as interrogations, everything a suspect does in his interactions with undercover agents may be seen (and regulated) as testimonial.
If the United States regulates the presentation of evidence at trial, and the use jurors may make of it, this makes sense in a legal system in which the primary locus of fact-finding is the trial. By contrast, as Damaska notes, "Continental trials are far from the climactic events the native folklore proclaims them to be-especially as generators of information for the adjudicator." While the common law trial "still stands far apart from the rest of procedural activities, overshadowing them in its critical importance as supplier of information to the court,"
Continental trials appear to be "a mere stage in a continuing procedural effort." 145 Regulating the acquisition of evidence rather than the way it is presented or used makes sense in a legal system in which the trial is only one procedural phase in the handling and sifting of evidence.
The scope of German protections against deceptive interrogations -and the debate about whether to extend such norms to the undercover context-also testifies to the legal system's
Crimes like perjury and obstruction of justice presuppose a symbiotic relationship between investigators and suspects, since investigative tactics prompt and shape the evasive choices of suspects. The same is true even for financial crimes like money laundering and structuring of financial transactions to avoid reporting requirements. These crimes cover up other offenses;
and they are designed to evade routine procedures for detecting the underlying criminal conduct.
(By contrast to these second order violations, the crime being concealed is less likely to have been committed in the shadow of a concrete investigation or routine enforcement procedure.)
Because investigative activity triggers second order crimes, police and prosecutors have reasons to favor tactics that influence targets and provoke provable lies, obstruction, or other second order misconduct, particularly since second order offenses (like possession offenses and conspiracy) may be easier to prove than the primary crimes. Investigators may question suspects about incriminating conversations they have on tape, in the hopes that suspects will make false denials. Prosecutors may ask a business for documents in the hope that the request will prompt targets to destroy the requested evidence under the watchful eye of informants. Courts may frown on some investigative tactics, like the setting of "perjury traps"; but since second order offenses react to investigative conduct (like the issuance of a subpoena), the criminalization of lies and obstruction means that police and prosecutors will regularly be able to influence targets in ways that yield evidence of some crime, even if it is only a crime of concealment. Put differently, any evidence of a second order crime such as perjury is likely to be at least partly the product of government action, be it only the posing of a question. A system that accepts some government influence on targets as inevitable in the pursuit of second order crimes is likely to be more tolerant of manipulation than one which prosecutes targets primarily for crimes they commit independently of the government. And when a legal system tolerates some manipulation of targets in the pursuit of evidence, investigative lies may become accepted as only one among a number of possible strategies for "flushing out" out truthful admissions or provable lies. One might say, then, that the United States permits the police to lie precisely because suspects may not.
The disputed compatibility of covert tactics with interrogation norms is also a symptom of the difficulty a legal system encounters in justifying exceptions to investigative norms (such as interrogation rules) that functions as rules of evidence. When evidentiary rules apply not to the presentation of evidence but rather to the ways in which information is acquired from a particular source, like the accused, there is a natural tendency to apply such rules comprehensively to every investigative tactic that elicits information from that source. Otherwise investigators may use one tactic (like undercover policing) to evade constraints on others (like questioning by the police.) Critics of undercover investigations and other "evasive" alternatives would deter investigators from circumventing interrogation norms by regulating all covert and overt investigative tactics that seek evidence from the accused. In order to exempt undercover investigation from the investigative norms that apply to interrogation, the German legal system has therefore had to develop comparable evidentiary constraints on undercover investigations (as alternatives to interrogation rules.) The warrant requirement serves precisely this function.
Evidentiary constraints on investigative conduct thus have a tendency to propagate. In the attempt to reach all "functional alternatives" to regulated investigative conduct, rules for the acquisition of evidence generate ever new forms of investigative constraint.
